



expert hierarchies of the
US hydrocarbon industry
Sean Field
University of St Andrews, Scotland
Abstract
Drawing on ethnographic research in Houston, Texas, I explore how oil and gas experts
negotiate social power and precariousness within the US hydrocarbon sector. In an
industry long associated with corporate power, the careers of experts are precariously
balanced on rising and falling hydrocarbon prices. This makes the social power these
experts wield as fluid as the commodities they are premised on. I show that informal
social networks solidified by industry associations can buffer this precariousness by
opening new employment opportunities and allowing them to maintain their connec-
tion to elite industry circles through periods of unemployment and uncertainty. For
many working in the industry, precariousness defines the US hydrocarbon sector as
much as the wealth that it is known to generate. Precariousness, I argue, is not just
experienced by specific groups of people but rather is a general characteristic of
capitalism that touches all but a select few.
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I met Sam in the elevator on the way to the Petroleum Club in downtown
Houston, Texas.1 He extended his arm to shake hands with me and said in a
confident tone: ‘Sam Wilson’. We were both on our way to a monthly luncheon
hosted by the Houston Oil Association, which is attended by the hydrocarbon
industry’s corporate elite. Sam told me that he is a founding member of the asso-
ciation and a regular at ‘the club’.2 We chatted on the 35-floor ascent, as we
strolled off the elevator into the Petroleum Club’s ornate lobby, and down the
lush-carpeted hallway to a vast reception room overlooking the cityscape. With a
decor described by its interior designer as ‘Madmen style’, the predominantly black
and gold internal colour scheme of the club is a symbolic representation of the
American oil industry’s mainstay commodity, crude oil, and the wealth that
American oil capitalism can generate3 (McLean, 2018: 82). The Petroleum Club
exemplifies the power and prestige of the US oil industry. This is where successful
and aspiring ‘oil men’ come to dine in luxury, drink bourbon and socialize. It is the
perfect location for marque industry events like this luncheon. Sam and I collected
our prepared name placards at the reception desk and blended into the crowd of
men wearing suits, where I spotted several interlocutors from my field work.
Sam, I later found out, has decades of experience in the Texas oil industry and
has held multiple roles over his career. He has worked as a commercial lender to oil
and gas companies, an investment banker with Enron, an executive of a medium-
sized independent exploration and production company, and as an industry con-
sultant. ‘Have you ever been on a rig?’ he asks with a grin; ‘It’s intoxicating . . . oil
gets in your blood’, ‘I just love the industry, and I love the people in it.’ For Sam,
the industry represents the best of American capitalism: it provides opportunities
for aspiring oil entrepreneurs and ‘wildcatters’ who are willing to take personal
financial risks, and it creates jobs and fuels domestic national economic growth.
Working in the US oil industry is a source of personal and nationalistic pride for
Sam, but you need ‘to know the right people’ he told me. ‘As big as [the industry]
is’, he says, ‘it’s amazing . . . how closed it is.’ This association luncheon is part of a
performance in knowing ‘the right people’. The luncheons are opportunities to
network with colleagues in the middle and upper expert echelons of the industry,
exchange business cards with new contacts and talk about deals that are not yet
public. Sam seemed to know almost everyone and introduced me to several people.
Tall with hair neatly parted to the side, he confidently moved through the crowd,
joining one small group of men talking and joking, then after a few minutes he
joined another, and later another. He and the others shook hands, swapped stories,
talked business and slapped each other on the shoulders after delivering their
punchlines. It all seemed grand and Sam was one of a few people at the centre
of it all. I was surprised, then, that when I called the phone number on Sam’s
business card few days later, the woman who answered said he was no longer with
the firm and could not be reached. Sam’s status in the industry’s expert hierarchies
was seemingly more precarious than it had first appeared.
The luncheon and my interaction with Sam reminded me of Mason’s (2019)
description of the performance of hydrocarbon expertise. Mason (2019) has shown
304 Critique of Anthropology 41(3)
that experts play a central role in producing and distributing technological and
economic knowledge in the US hydrocarbon industry, but that the performance of
expertise is not purely technical. There is also a socio-corporeal element to this
performance he suggests, a ‘social life of energy extraction’ (Mason, 2019: 125).
Luxury settings where industry events are hosted are a key aspect of this perfor-
mance4 (Mason and Stoilkova, 2012). These performances are the qualitative
dimension of experts’ social power that demonstrate the quality of their knowledge
(Mason, 2019). Ho (2009) and Zaloom (2004) have similarly observed that embod-
ied performances are crucial to expertise inside investment bank and derivative
trading communities. For Zaloom’s (2004) traders, this performance on the trad-
ing floor (before mass digitization) was an aggressive masculine physical exchange
of pushing, shoving, yelling and physical positioning. For Ho (2009: 37, 41), the
performance of expertise in the investment banking community was founded on
the ‘power’ of elite ‘whiteness’ and the outward appearance of ‘being impeccably
and smartly dressed’. Yet, as Ho (2009), Miyazaki (2013) and Zaloom (2004) have
demonstrated, social hierarchies of expertise can be fluid and shifting. Ho (2009:
273) explains ‘layoffs and job insecurity’ forms part of the cultural fabric of the
New York investment banking community; job precariousness is the ‘risk’ associ-
ated with the financial rewards that investment banking can yield for those work-
ing in the industry (Ho, 2009: 257, 272–3). For Miyazaki (2013), the professional
fate of the arbitrage unit inside the Japanese bank where his ethnography was
based was determined when the bank decided to disband the unit after it had
been out-competed by American and European arbitrageurs. For Zaloom
(2004), several bad trades left one commodity trader literally sleeping on the
street. What these scholars show is that the performance of expertise entails
embodied social interactions with others, and that the employment and social
status of experts can be precarious. These works, however, focus on workplace
settings and working relationships within firms and workplaces. What they do not
explore is how informal social networks that cut across firms and are solidified by
industry associations, are an element of expert performance that can buffer social
and employment precariousness and keep people within these communities
through periods of unemployment.
In an industry long associated with the corporate power of oil majors, the social
power of experts within the industry’s hierarchies is fluid and at times tenuous –
waxing and waning with boom-bust cycles in hydrocarbon prices that can lead to
mass layoffs and unemployment. While I explore how industry insiders ethically
value hydrocarbons and how they engage with risk and responsibility elsewhere,
here I advance the literature on experts by showing how informal social networks
are key to the performance of expertise and, importantly, a means by which to
hedge against social and employment precariousness (Field, in press, forthcoming
a). Maintaining the ‘economy of appearances’ through informal social networks
and embodied performances in elite industry spaces, I show, is vital to helping
interlocutors retain some social power through bouts of unemployment by main-
taining their connections within, and belonging to, the hydrocarbon industry’s
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expert hierarchies (Tsing, 2000: 115). In the process, I respond to Souleles and
Archer’s (this issue) provocation on ‘studying up’ by providing novel insights into
how social power and precariousness are negotiated within an industry seen by
many outsiders as monolithically ‘powerful’ (Hughes, 2017: 4; Maddow, 2020: xx).
To do this, I draw on ethnographic field research that I began in late 2018 in
Houston, Texas, when the industry teetered on, then entered, a ‘bust’ cycle with
stagnating and later falling oil prices. My interlocutors include private equity
partners, managing directors, bankers, lawyers, accountants, consultants and engi-
neers engaged in the practice of energy investing and lending (most in senior and
leadership positions). They let me into their offices, their homes, and their lives,
enabling me to carry out interviews, participate in private industry events, ‘hang
out’ with them informally, and observe the oil finance sector from inside the enig-
matic close-knit social circles that cut across firms. I begin by discussing the entan-
glement of hydrocarbon expertise, social power dynamics, and precariousness,
including distinguishing precariousness from precarity. I then turn attention
back to Sam and other interlocutors in the industry. I reflect on what these eth-
nographic examples show and how precariousness (and hedging against it) is as
much a part of the industry as trying to claim a piece of the wealth that hydro-
carbons generate. I conclude by suggesting that, while my interlocutors are not the
precariat, the distinction between precarity and precariousness is blurred, and that
precariousness is perhaps a more general characteristic of capitalism.
Hydrocarbon expertise, precariousness and shifting social
power dynamics
Finding hydrocarbons and controlling the mineral rights to produce them is at the
heart of wildcatter dreams of becoming successful ‘oil men’, the source of oil family
fortunes, and the profit-making aspirations of independent producers and corpo-
rate oil majors alike (Appel, 2019; Clark, 2016; High, forthcoming). Even before
hydrocarbons are extracted from deep underground, however, deposits are com-
modified as units of oil and gas to be extracted (Field, in press; Wood, 2016). The
rights to these future hydrocarbons can be bought, sold and traded for a portion of
their future expected financial value based on engineering and financial experts’
estimates and projections (Field, forthcoming a; Wood, 2016). Once produced, oil
and gas enters a world of pipelines, pumping stations, storage tanks and refineries
on the way to the point of consumption (High and Field, 2020; Simpson, 2019).
From initial hydrocarbon exploration and the ‘potentiality’ of oil, to the marketing
of refined oil and gas products, leagues of contractors and various experts are
involved in the process – deriving a piece of the financial value that hydrocarbons
generate in the form of compensation, fees, interest and profit sharing
(Weszkalnys, 2015; Wood, 2019).
Only a handful of interlocutors I know are independent ‘oil men’, carving
careers and identities from personally financing and directing their own
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exploration and production companies. The majority of my interlocutors are
financial, legal, and technological specialists who use the power of their expertise
to ‘chase oil’, as one interlocutor put it. In their various roles, experts play a vital
part in the US oil and gas industry – making and steering managerial decisions,
crafting financial imaginaries of the future, deciding whether wells are drilled, and
acting as gatekeepers of capital (Field, in press; Mason, 2019). Their expertise
combines experiential-performance with authoritative ways of ‘knowing’ (Boyer,
2008). ‘Knowing’ is signalled by their insider knowledge and usage of the indus-
try’s lexicon – the ‘economic-oil speak’, industry-specific legal terms, financial
metrics, and forecast modelling (Carr, 2010; Field, forthcoming a; Mason,
2019). Experiential-performance, meanwhile, is demonstrated through their pro-
fessional achievements (number of deals they have closed for example) and their
socio-corporeal performances in industry spaces and at industry events.
When interlocutors in Houston talk about ‘power’ they often refer to the
industrial-technological capacity of hydrocarbons ‘to do work’, and marvel at
how this consolidated form of solar-biogenic energy concealed underground has
yielded innumerable benefits for people around the world (Lennon, 2017: 19).
These reflections often give way to how industrial-technological power is con-
nected to social and geopolitical power. Power is used by some interlocutors in
a geopolitical sense to refer to the ‘market power’ of OPEC countries, Russia, and
China to influence the price, supply and demand for oil in competition with the
United States. Many interlocutors, like Sam for example, talk about their work in
the oil and gas sector as contributing to a nationalist project and the maintenance
of American geopolitical supremacy. ‘Cheap gasoline’, Sam pridefully told me, is
what keeps planes, cars and trucks moving across the United States and around
the world – it is the ‘lifeblood’ of American capitalism (Huber, 2013). Like High’s
(2019) interlocutors in Colorado’s hydrocarbon industry, the ethical obligation of
powering American capitalism is what drew some of them to the oil industry and
keeps them in it – like Sam.
In other instances, power emerges as regional and localized social ‘power struc-
tures’, as one interlocutor put it, grounded in oil family dynasties and personal
fortunes that can impede or finance the entrepreneurial ambitions of aspiring ‘oil
men’. Many in the industry’s expert hierarchies are well compensated, especially
those at the top. On the one hand, wealth is symbolic of social significance and the
cumulative importance of experts’ creative labour (Graeber, 2001). As one inter-
locutor told me: ‘making money is a way of keeping score’ of how ‘good’ someone
is. On the other hand, wealth (especially extreme forms) enables individuals’ capac-
ity for elite agential social action – it can release individuals from the necessity to
work to earn money, give them the capacity to exert social influence through
philanthropic activities, and endow them as aspirational symbols of prestige. It
also enables them to exert control on the world around them through the purchase
and ownership of assets, companies and labour. Many interlocutors that I know
within the industry’s expert ranks aspire to make their fortunes in oil and gas and
become ‘billionaires’, hoping their expertise and networks that cut across social
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strata of the highest echelons and firms will facilitate this ascent. Organizations
such as the Houston Oil Association and venues such as the Petroleum Club are
some of the exclusive spaces where experts and social elites from across the indus-
try can informally network.
Boyer (2014) suggests that one way to frame how social power operates in
energy industries is in terms of ‘energopower’. Energopower takes its cue from
Foucault’s biopower as a way to frame interventions of expertise and authority on
issues of energy and the Anthropocene (Boyer, 2014: 322). For Boyer (2014: 325),
energopower is akin to biopower but pays specific attention to how political power
operates through electricity and fuel. The problem with this concept, as formulat-
ed, is that it is a ‘provocative placeholder’ rather than a definitive concept and
leaves vague the ways that social power dynamics might unfold in energy industries
via everyday practices. For Foucault, by contrast, the concept of (bio)power is
‘shorthand for . . . relations of power’ that can be structured by institutions or
prevailing social norms at particular times and places. Power, in Foucault’s for-
mulation, emerges as the ability to control and influence the conduct of others;
while institutions and norms can help stabilize webs of social relations into hier-
archical power structures, these relationships are ‘mobile . . . and not fixed once and
for all’ (Foucault, 1994: 291–2). For framing how social power dynamics unfold in
the expert hierarchies of the hydrocarbon industry, this conceptualization is far
more helpful. My observation is that the social power structures within the indus-
try can be conceptualized as overlapping and semi-fluid organizational and social
hierarchies where people occupy multiple shifting positions based on their profes-
sional roles, association memberships, and familial networks. Individuals’ posi-
tions within these hierarchies are characterized by their agential capacity to exert
influence and control over the hierarchical dynamics around them and the material
economic processes in the hydrocarbon industry using their wealth and expertise.5
They are semi-fluid because, while many interlocutors I know are wealthy and
powerful in their own regard, their careers and strategic positions in these hierar-
chies are precariously balanced on rising and falling commodity prices, inter-
capitalist competition and industry trends.
Precariousness has been used to describe and conceptualize the predicament of
crafting livelihoods in circumstances that are, in varying degrees, out of our indi-
vidual control (Butler, 2004, 2009; Mattingly, 2012). Often it has been applied to
those trying to craft a livelihood from subsistence activities and ‘short-term “gigs”’
(Kasmir, 2018: 2), although it has also been more broadly deployed to describe an
absence of secure employment. For Allison (2013), for example, precarity refers to
a deviation from the historically specific and placed-based Fordist norm of secure
work and income. Butler (2009), by contrast, distinguishes precarity from precar-
iousness. Butler (2009) uses precarity to denote an unequally distributed corporeal
vulnerability imposed on people by natural disasters, war and poverty, delineated
along the lines of privilege in her analysis of war. She uses precariousness, mean-
while, to denote a collective corporeal vulnerability – a shared human condition
that implies ‘a dependency on people we know, or barely know, or know not at all’
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(Butler 2009: 14). Without adopting the corporeal specifics of Butler’s (2009) ana-
lytical lens, this is a helpful distinction for the present analysis. Sam and other
interlocutors I know are not part of an under-privileged precariat that experience
precarity in the sense describe by Butler (2009), as they are often empowered in
their managerial roles to implement labour regimes on workers that give rise to
precarious work for others. At these upper echelons of the industry’s hierarchies,
one might assume that they are beyond precariousness. Yet, even at these high
levels, they too are subject to social and employment instability associated with
capitalism and induced by hydrocarbon price cycles, where US oil prices histori-
cally tend to crash every six to ten years. They experience precariousness. For Sam
and others, precariousness forms part of their identity and a capitalistic lifestyle in
ways that depart from traditional notions of precariousness that centre on poverty
and a lack of structural decision-making power. For them, social and employment
precariousness in the elite expert hierarchies of the hydrocarbon industry is the
precondition for claiming a piece of the wealth the industry generates. It is part of
the wildcatter ethos that reverberates throughout the US industry’s ranks and is a
fundamental characteristic of capitalism, whereby precariousness touches almost
everyone.
Informal professional networks solidified by industry associations can hedge
some of the social and employment precariousness of working in the industry’s
upper echelons. As Salverda and Abbink (2013: 12) suggest, ‘ties of friendship . . .
clubs, hunting parties, [and] families’ can ‘create culturally validated bonds of
trust . . . solidarity and commonality of interest’ that are under-emphasized in anal-
yses of formal social hierarchies set by firms and institutions (Salverda and
Abbink, 2013: 12). Even Mills (1964 [1956]: 37, 39), who took formalized social
hierarchies as his analytical framework, emphasized the importance of informally
organized ‘crowds’ of the old, new and aspiring upper classes who ‘know one
another, see one another socially and at business’. For Mills (1964 [1956]: 11,
37), these ‘crowds’ have overlapping personal and professional backgrounds and
‘take one another into account’ in ‘coordinat[ing] viewpoints and decisions’ in
business and society. In a similar vein, Courtois (2013: 163) found social events
and exclusive clubs can solidify and prolong social connections within the business
community in her exploration of elite schools and corporate executives in Ireland.
Social networks help build consensus among elites, she contends, and provide a
space for ‘political, corporate, and social elites, old wealth and new wealth, to
mingle informally’ (Courtois, 2013: 163). Ho (2009) too emphasizes the importance
of informal networks in her ethnography of Wall Street; for Ho (2009: 13, 86–7),
kinship and elite university networks are a bridge to employment in finance.
Settings such as ‘bars’ and ‘the golf course’ are as important as the boardroom
in making and solidifying these social bonds (Ho, 2009: 87). Having ‘strong’ net-
works is also key to surviving bouts of unemployment for elite bankers, Ho (2009:
220) suggests, although she does not elaborate on this point. Here, I pick up where
these authors leave off by drawing on several ethnographic encounters in the US
hydrocarbon industry to show how informal social networks and embodied
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socio-corporeal performances in industry spaces not only advance private and
corporate interests, but are key to surviving social and employment precariousness.
I begin by returning to my encounter with Sam.
‘Mississippi riverboat gambler’
When Sam and I parted at the luncheon, he enthusiastically agreed to meet in the
coming weeks. I tried to get in touch with him in the following days, but my emails
went unanswered and I could not reach him by phone. Sam unexpectedly called me
on the phone a few days later. Instead of beaming with confidence, his voice now
sounded strained. There were several long pauses, and his words were punctuated
by a couple of elongated sighs and ‘errrr’s as he seemingly searched for the right
words as we spoke. He told me that he had given me his ‘old business card’ and
explained that he had recently, and abruptly, left the firm that he had been
employed with – he had been let go. The last few weeks had been ‘difficult’, he
said, but he insisted it was a ‘good’ move for him. He was setting up his own firm
now, which was why it had taken him a while to get in touch – he had been busy
getting his next project established.
We met a week later for lunch at a pub on the west side of Houston. Far from
the glamour and formality of the Petroleum Club, this time Sam was wearing a golf
shirt and slacks. I met him outside and we shook hands as he strolled over from his
large luxury SUV. His confidence seemed renewed. Over lunch we continued our
conversation from a few weeks earlier about the highs and lows of working in the
oil and gas industry. Reflecting on the industry downturn and his recent change in
employment, he explained:
This industry has so much cyclicality, so much up and down, and uncertainty.. . .
I think anybody that gets in this industry and stays in it, somewhere in their blood-
line . . . it’s got to be a Mississippi riverboat gambler, because it’s the only way you can
stay in this industry. You’ve got to have somebody in your background, in your
family tree, there has got to be somebody who’s willing to roll the dice.
Like many interlocutors, Sam approaches his career in the oil and gas industry
with a sense of optimistic fatalism. Having been in the industry for decades, he
knows that long downward trends in the price of hydrocarbons mean job precar-
iousness and perhaps unemployment, even for industry veterans like him. When oil
and gas prices are going up, business can go ‘really well’, he says; but, when ‘oil
and gas prices tank’ business can be ‘really tough’. Working as a consultant, he
relies heavily on his networks of colleagues and industry friends to generate busi-
ness in ‘tough’ times. He looked at me and said: ‘I know enough people in the
industry . . . to make a living based on helping to fill some of their needs.’ It was
through his industry social networks that he acquired the job he had just abruptly
lost; he subsequently relied on these networks, perhaps more than ever, as he
started his own consultancy.
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I continued to meet with Sam at the monthly industry association meetings at
the Petroleum Club over the coming months. Suit-clad and proud, he continued in
his role as one of the association’s founding members – networking and chatting
with old colleagues, association guests and new members. Sam reminded me of the
multiple ways that social power and precariousness is negotiated in this community
of hydrocarbon experts and ‘oil men’. While disempowered by the recent change in
his employment, he vied to maintain some of his social status in the community
through his presence and socio-corporeal performance at the association – being
seen and maintaining friendships and networks with the ‘right’ people in positions
of social power. Sam’s expertise is not just managerial advising and technical
forecasting, it also draws on the economy of appearances – the dramatic perfor-
mance of success and confidence even in times of personal precariousness. Sam is
not unique in this regard, however. I met Shane, for example, on the way to a
monthly breakfast meeting of another industry club, the Oil Finance Association,
in late 2019. Its meetings are smaller than the luncheon meetings of the Houston
Oil Association, and more focused on the city’s oil finance sector. Hosted at a
discreet downtown location not far from the Petroleum Club, key figures from
across Houston’s energy finance sector gather once a month to talk about finance
deals, to network, and to share industry gossip. ‘Going to the association break-
fast?’ he asked as we both strolled onto the elevator. We had seen each other before
at previous meetings but had never chatted. Shane holds multiple roles in the
industry – in addition to being a senior executive with a private investment firm,
he consults with some of the largest oil and gas private equity firms in Houston.
We shook hands and exchanged business cards, as is custom among my inter-
locutors, and strolled out of the elevator into the large lobby to join dozens of
suit-clad men drinking coffee and chatting in small groups. As we retrieved our
prepared association name tags from the reception table that identified us as
members, another man joined us. Shane knew him – they shook hands and he
introduced us. ‘Bob’s at Slate Capital . . .’ Shane said, as his eyes drifted towards
the hand-written white paper name tag Bob had just attached to his lapel – unlike
our association branded engraved name tags. ‘Actually’, Bob said, ‘I’m on my
own . . . I’m no longer with them.’ Like Sam, Bob abruptly found himself ‘self-
employed’ and looking for work after decades of working in the industry.
Quickly setting up one’s own home-based firm for self-employment was a strategy
several interlocutors I know deployed in response to sudden changes in their
employment status. Shane let out a billowing laugh as he pointed to Bob’s
paper name tag with the name of his new company ‘Bob Z’s Investment
Associates Inc.’. Seemingly embarrassed and uncomfortable with Shane’s reaction,
Bob’s face looked like he had just swallowed a spider, and he shifted from one
loafer to the other. Shane slapped Bob on the shoulder in an ‘old pal’ sort of way
and told us he had to ‘go talk to some people’ before confidently strolling into the
adjacent crowd of suits. Bob was unable to salvage the interaction and, seemingly
deflated, shook hands and exchanged business cards with me before he too dis-
appeared into the crowd, although far less boisterously than Shane. He was
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incapable of performing the economy of appearances as well as Sam in the face of
precariousness – his socio-corporeal presentation was less polished and under-
mined the quality of his expertise via his embodied performance. This interaction
is illustrative of negotiating the shifting interpersonal social-power dynamics
between members of this exclusive club of energy financiers and how asymmetries
can emerge as, and in, social interactions. While Bob and Shane are peers and both
are members of the association, Bob’s status was seemingly diminished by his
sudden change in employment. He no longer had the institutional power he
once held as a gatekeeper of capital; and while his expertise was not diminished,
his ability to exert influence within the industry through his professional role
seemingly had. This association meeting was an opportunity to maintain his con-
nection with this elite community, even if some interactions, like the one with
Shane, were humbling.
The precariousness experienced by Sam and Bob is not uncommon in expert
hierarchies of the US hydrocarbon industry. The ‘utterly confusing’ and ‘mind-
boggling’ volatility of hydrocarbon prices can lead to thousands of layoffs, chal-
lenging the moral ambitions of those working in the industry to persevere in the
face of dismal personal financial prospects (Appel et al., 2015: 8; High, 2019;
Wood, 2019). Recently, an analyst with a young family that I know found the
entire oil and gas unit at the investment bank he worked for in Houston laid off,
including him – to his surprise. As a junior analyst without extensive social net-
works in the industry, it took him several months to secure a new entry-level
position, which was later liquidated as the industry descended into a deep retrac-
tion. In a similar example, in the autumn of 2019, over half the staff in the oil and
gas unit at Wells Fargo in Houston, which competes with JP Morgan Chase and
Bank of America to be the largest commercial financier to the oil and gas industry,
were liquidated to the surprise of interlocutors I know. Many I know hope oil and
gas prices will rise, instigating a ‘boom’ in employment and compensation, with the
knowledge that falling commodity prices and associated job ‘purges’ (as one inter-
locutor put it) across the sector are inevitable. My ethnographic encounters with
Sam and Bob highlight some of the ways that informal social networks, solidified
through industry associations, can buttress this erosion – even if only partially.
Associations that connect people across firms not only symbolize who is in this
community, they are also a means of showing who is still in ‘the game’ through
boom-and-bust cycles.
‘I don’t want to retire’
Like Sam and Bob, Peter is well acquainted with the precariousness that working
in the US hydrocarbon industry can bring. When we first met in 2019, he confided
in me that he was actively searching for a new job opportunity because he was not
sure how much longer his current job would last. In his current role, he is a
management consultant specializing in large corporate bankruptcies and restruc-
turing in the hydrocarbon sector. There was little bankruptcy work at the
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beginning of 2019 when we first met, and the fate of senior directors at his firm
depended on quarterly reviews of how much business and profit each staff member
was contributing to the firm. Peter has nearly four decades of experience, having
held senior roles as an engineer, investment banker, commercial lender, and exec-
utive of an exploration and production company to name a few. He originally
trained as a petroleum engineer because, he told me, it paid well and he hoped it
would let him travel the world. Now, as a senior director, he is a member of a
number of exclusive associations and I sometimes see him at the luncheons at the
Petroleum Club – although we meet up regularly outside the club. At times in his
career, Peter has found himself involuntarily unemployed. In bad times, he says, it
can be hard to ‘show your face’ at association meetings and industry events.
Maintaining social networks through industry associations and saving face
through bouts of unemployment is important, but shifting social dynamics
among colleagues can make for uncomfortable encounters and make one feel
vulnerable – like Bob. Describing an exchange with his wife during one these
periods of ‘self-employment’, he said:
My wife said I was unemployed. I said I’m not unemployed. I’m self-employed. You
can’t be unemployed when you’re self-employed . . .. Eventually, after months of not
earning any money, I had to concede I was probably unemployed.
His informal social networks eventually helped him weather this period of ‘self-
employment’ through private consultancy work and later an employment oppor-
tunity. With the recent downturn that has enveloped the hydrocarbon industry
since late-2019, his work in bankruptcies is busy and secure for the foreseeable
future. In his current counter-cyclical professional role, the expert power that Peter
wields is helping corporate managers across the US oil and gas industry decide
who will get paid and what will be written off. He explained,
One of the exercises in bankruptcy is deciding: This is how the company is going to
come out of bankruptcy, this is how they’re going to finance it, these are the wells
they’re going to drill.
Alternatively, he says, we ‘liquidate the company . . . let everybody go and sell the
assets’, in a conversational exchange that reminded me of Ho’s (2009) ethnography
of Wall Street. He told me that he gets phone calls a couple times a week from
colleagues and friends across the industry who are ‘nervous’ about their job secu-
rity or recently ‘self-employed’, wanting to know if his firm is hiring experienced
energy financiers and senior managers. Suggesting that there is a limit to which
social networks can buffer precariousness in the midst of a major downturn, Peter
told me: ‘It’s understood by people who’ve been around, that this might be what
pushes them out of the industry into retirement or into other [industries] . . .’
Sometimes he gets calls from people within the far stretches of his social net-
work wanting his assessment of other people in the industry: Who are they?
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Are they trustworthy? Are they an ‘asshole’? Informal networks within the indus-
try not only provide new job opportunities but also a system of ‘checks’, Peter and
others told me. With a few phone calls, a person in this community of experts can
figure out who a newcomer or an insider is, who they know, and whether they
should do business with them. It is, relatedly, no coincidence that the interlocutors
I describe are white men not unlike myself. In one of the most racially diverse cities
in the Unites States, non-white workers are estimated to comprise only 12% of the
industry’s work force, and African Americans only 7% (Greater Houston
Partnership, 2020; Osborne, 2020). Women account for 10–15% of the workforce,
of whom very few hold executive and managerial positions6 (Yanosek et al., 2019).
As I address elsewhere, interlocutors said this lack of diversity in the hierarchies of
the industry is about building networks of trust, which can raise barriers to new-
comers (Field, forthcoming b). Interlocutors are making and managing invest-
ments and loans worth billions of dollars, they tell me, and they want to work
with people they know and are familiar with – implying that informal social net-
works are an artefact of past capital practices and the basis for new capital
arrangements.
Embracing and escaping precariousness: ‘It’s the way you live’
Despite his stable employment for the time being amid a wave of bankruptcies
since late 2019, Peter’s current role is not the end of his ambition in the hydro-
carbon industry. He wants to build and run his own exploration and production
company. His own company would potentially enable him to be in a decision-
making role with even greater influence and control. Peter explains: ‘I’m at a stage
now where I really want to do something. One more shot at: build it and run
it . . . be in a decision-making role . . . even if you’re out of work.’ again.
The idea of wanting to ‘build’ something is one I hear often from interloc-
utors and it reflects a desire to assert greater agential control within the industry
and over one’s career trajectory. In some sense, it is akin to wanting to ‘own
where they work’ (Souleles, 2020: 30).7 It is financially risky because it could fail
and, ultimately, as he says, he could be out of work again; or, it could be a
success and he could make a lot of money doing it – at least he hopes so. He
embraces precariousness as a means to escape precariousness. Peter approaches
this potentiality with a sense of optimistic fatalism, he is well aware how pre-
carious work can be, even for experienced experts like him. ‘No one is above it’,
Peter says, referring to the havoc that falling oil and gas prices can wreak on
companies and careers. Even the ‘icons or mini icons’ in the industry can fail he
told me – suggesting a shared sense of precariousness. For Peter, hard times
could mean forgoing a salary for months when things are ‘awful’. He has enough
savings to do that, but he cannot ‘bet the farm’, he told me, because he has
family (including kids in college) who depend on him financially. Peter is not
‘rich’ by industry standards, but he has enough wealth to have ‘options’ he says,
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revealing the sort of financial privilege he enjoys and that the precariousness he
embraces will not end in complete financial ruin.
His pursuit of greater power in the face of precariousness is shaped by the
industry’s social networks he told me, explaining:
I don’t want to retire. I could tough talk like I’m going to call it quits, and my wife
and I would sell our house and downsize, and still have more money than most. It’s
hard to work around people who’ve made it . . . the other day we were talking about
how many billionaires I’ve met and ones that weren’t billionaires before. You meet a
few of those where it’s like, he’s just a guy . . . that twists your ending.
Having his end goals ‘twisted’ not only reflects the sentiments of other interloc-
utors I know who also wish to be ‘billionaires’, but also the ways in which those at
the very top of the informal social hierarchies in the industry influence the personal
goals of those in its upper expert ranks. Being a billionaire is an ultimate form of
agential social power – it is to be recognized as having ‘made it’ and to be endowed
with the capacity to exert philanthropic influence and control over capital. It is to
escape precariousness. ‘Billionaires’ and places such as the Petroleum Club, where
cross-sections of the industry’s social elite come to mingle, serve as emblematic
reminders that the US hydrocarbon industry can endow ‘exceptional’ individuals
that are willing to face social and employment precariousness with great wealth,
influence and control. These reminders invoke socio-corporeal performances
among experts and help give shape to the industry’s ever shifting hierarchies
that define those at the top from those in the echelons below, where precariousness
rises as one descends the hierarchy. In this sense, the distinction between precar-
iousness and precarity becomes blurred; while precariousness is shared, billionaires
are the exception. The degree to which it is shared, moreover, varies based on
where one finds oneself in the industry’s hierarchies. While interlocutors I know
are not part of the precariat, these delineations are closer to what Butler (2009)
describes as precarity rather than precariousness. Reflecting on the tension
between pursuit of social power and the precariousness of working in the industry,
Peter explains: ‘It’s not just money, it’s the way you live.’ What he suggests is
that precariousness (or precarity) is a way of life for those working in the industry
that it is as integral to its social structures as the wealth it generates – defining its
hierarchical structures, where people fit into these structures, and how they live.
Conclusion
Sam and Peter do not see themselves as victims, but as entrepreneurs, willing to
optimistically embrace the precariousness of working in the US hydrocarbon
industry.8 My ethnographic encounters with Sam show how operating in spaces
emblematic of wealth and maintaining social relationships within the industry’s
upper echelons help hedge the erosion of his social power and buffer his employ-
ment precariousness. My ethnographic encounters with Peter show how at times he
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has found himself in Sam’s position and that his informal social networks helped
him weather these periods of ‘self-employment’. His social networks in the industry
also inform his ambition of wanting to be a billionaire. These social networks that
Sam and Peter share in the industry are not only a relic of past capital practices,
but the basis for new capital arrangements and a barrier to those not already
inducted into them. They, in part, define the industry’s shifting hierarchies and
are the social glue that holds the middle and upper echelons of this community
together through thick and thin – through boom and bust, through employment
and unemployment. In some ways these examples echo Mills’ (1964 [1956]: 11, 37)
argument about the importance of informal ‘crowds’ of old, new and aspiring
upper classes who know and see each other socially and in business – forming
overlapping social bonds that influence both spheres of life. Social power in these
examples, I have shown, emerges as Foucauldian-like relations of power that are
semi-fixed by formal and informal institutions, but perpetually negotiated and not
fixed once and for all. Informal social networks are a way by which interlocutors
I know can secure some of their expert social power, which can be eroded by
unemployment and employment precariousness. These networks can hedge off
some precariousness by helping interlocutors appear to stay ‘in the game’ and
regain employment; both Sam and Peter credit their networks with securing var-
ious positions over their careers. Their socio-corporeal performances in exclusive
industry associations and spaces, I have shown, are key to their participation in,
and maintenance of, these networks.
How Sam, Peter and others negotiate social power and precariousness through
these informal networks not only reveals novel insights into the hydrocarbon
industry’s expert hierarchies, but also how the boundary between precariousness
and precarity can be obscured. Interlocutors I know have a shared sense of pre-
cariousness associated with working in the oil and gas industry, yet this precari-
ousness is not equal. This makes this precariousness more akin to what Butler
(2009) calls precarity – a concept typically reserved for the precariat and those
most vulnerable in society. While the precariat might identify specific groups of
people, these ethnographic examples raise the question of whether social and
employment precariousness can be more broadly defined as a fundamental char-
acteristic of capitalism that touches all but billionaires. In an industry that is
largely opaque and seen as monolithically ‘powerful’ to outsiders, precariousness
is as pervasive as the wealth that flows through it.
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1. Sam is a pseudonym. The names of all interlocutors and associations in this article are
pseudonyms.
2. I joined the association in mid-2019 with the help of an interlocutor.
3. Madmen is a reference to the American television drama.
4. Salverda and Skovgaard-Smith (2018) make a similar argument in their study of Franco-
Mauritian management consultants.
5. I use ‘control’ to mean the capacity to direct and ‘influence’ to mean the capacity to
persuade.
6. These are industry-wide statistics, but my observations coincide with these statistics.
7. Souleles’ (2020) analysis focuses on Employee Stock Ownership Plan companies. While
very different, both ESOPs and Peter address a desire to exert agential control over a firm.
8. These sentiments may be interpreted as self-presentation, where interlocutors wish to
appear in control and satisfied with their situation but feel very differently than they
appear or purport to. I cannot exclude this possibility. However, for interlocutors like
Peter, who I got to know well, my sense is that these sentiments are genuine.
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